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Abstract
In this paper we analyze competition between firms with uncertain de-
mand functions. A duopoly model is considered in which two identical firms
producing homogeneous commodities compete in quantities. They face uncer-
tain market demand in a context in which two different future scenarios are
possible, and no information about the probability distribution of occurrence
of the scenarios is available.
This decision-making situation is formalized as a normal-form game with
vector-valued utility functions for which the notion of Pareto equilibrium is
adopted as a natural extension of that of Cournot equilibrium. Under stan-
dard assumptions about the demand functions, we characterize the complete
set of Pareto equilibria. In the second part of the paper, we analyse the
equilibria to which the agents will arrive depending on their attitude to risk.
We find that equilibria always exist if both agents are simultaneously pes-
simistic or optimistic. In the non-trivial cases, for pessimistic firms, infinitely
many equilibria exist, whereas when firms act optimistically, only those pairs
of strategies corresponding to the Cournot equilibria in each scenario can be
equilibria.
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1 Introduction
Uncertainty plays an important role in oligopolistic models since it is difficult or im-
possible to assure that random events will not influence the outcomes of oligopolis-
tic competition. For instance, firms often face major uncertainty about demand,
competitors’ costs, distribution of consumers’ reservation prices, and other mar-
ket features relevant in decision-making by the firms. Therefore, when managers
make choices or decisions in these situations, they must somehow incorporate this
uncertainty into their decision-making process.
This paper examines the effect of introducing uncertainty about demand in
duopoly models into a non-probabilistic framework. To this end, it is assumed
that there are several possible scenarios or states of nature, of which only one will
be realized as the true state, and the probabilities of occurrence of the different
scenarios are unknown. Specifically, we analyse the extension of a Cournot duopoly
(Cournot, 1838) in which two firms producing homogeneous products face a different
market demand in each one of two scenarios and they have to decide their strategies
on quantities before uncertainty is resolved.
Situations where firms face uncertain demand which depends on the final scenario
often occur in areas affected by political decisions that modify the initial demand
level. For instance, the demand in the solar energy market is highly influenced by the
presence or absence of financial support from the Government to consumers for the
installation of equipment. In the case of Government support, the demand changes
because new consumers with a different pattern of consumption enter the market.
Thus, companies involved in the market may face uncertain demand because there
are two possible future scenarios: with and without support. However, the firms’
strategic decisions about the level of supply they will offer often must be adopted
before the uncertainty about support is resolved.
Several oligopoly models under uncertainty have previously been addressed in the
literature. Lagerlo¨f (2007) and Grimm (2008) analyzed Cournot competition under
demand uncertainty for risk-neutral firms. They showed that multiple equilibria
may exist and provided a plausible setting in which uniqueness of the Cournot
equilibrium under demand uncertainty is guaranteed. The effects of introducing
attitudes to risk on oligopoly competition have been considered by Asplund (2002),
who analyzed competition in prices and quantities between risk-averse firms. Fontini
(2005) studied the impact that optimistic and pessimistic attitudes play in a Cournot
oligopoly when each firm is uncertain about whether the other firms will act as
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Cournot competitors.
In the aforementioned papers, uncertainty is introduced into the model through
randomness in the corresponding function and expected utility theory is applied to
make decisions. As a consequence, the results heavily depend on the probability dis-
tributions considered. However, a range of situations exists for which no information
about the probability distribution of the random variable is available, or in which
inaccuracy of the information about the probability distribution or about the distri-
bution parameters may yield unrealistic predictions. In such situations, subjective
expected theory (Savage, 1954), in which the decision-makers have beliefs in the
forms of probability distributions, is frequently applied. It has been argued that a
single probability distribution is insufficient to describe the decision-maker’s beliefs
in some situations of uncertainty. An alternative direction, in which uncertainty
aversion is taken into account is maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler,
1989), where the decision-maker considers a range of possible probabilities, and
preferences are represented by the minimum of all the expected utilities.
The case of complete absence of information about probability distributions can
be considered as an extreme case in the setting of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989),
which leads to the two well-known maxmin and maxmax criteria for choice under
uncertainty. The present research is developed in this decisional context.
The analysis presented in the paper contributes to the existing literature in
several ways. First, we assume that the profits of the firms depend on the future
scenarios, and no information exists on the probability of occurrence of each scenario.
As a consequence, unlike previous literature, the results about the equilibria in the
extended Cournot model do not rely on the assumptions or on the beliefs about
probability distributions, and our analysis covers situations where information is
not available. Second, firms are uncertain both about the reservation price and
about the number of consumers in the market. This way of modeling uncertainty
allows us to go beyond the cases discussed in the literature, where uncertainty is
considered only for one of the two features mentioned. And third, once the set of
equilibria for the Cournot duopoly with no assumption about the firms’ attitudes
towards risk is obtained, we analyse strategic competition for risk-averse firms and
also for firms that show preference for risk. In this decisional context, in which
firms have to decide their strategies on quantities before uncertainty is resolved,
we present an ex-ante analysis which permits the identification of the equilibria to
which risk-averse firms and risk-preference firms will eventually arrive.
To begin our analysis, we establish a general framework for the study of duopolis-
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tic competitions under uncertainty, where, as is usual in oligopoly models, for rea-
sons of analytical tractability, we assume the demand functions are linear. As Vives
(1984) pointed out, such an assumption presents the unappealing feature that neg-
ative prices and outputs can be obtained. However, the non-negativity of outputs
is included in our analysis, and even though negative prices are possible, we prove
that the prices in any non-degenerate equilibrium are positive.
The Cournot duopoly under uncertainty is formalized as a game with vector-
valued utility functions. The natural extension of the concept of Nash equilibrium
was introduced by Shapley (1959) for the class of multicriteria matrix games with the
name of Pareto equilibrium. Bade (2005) studied the existence of Pareto equilibria
in games with vector payoffs in which agents’ preferences are incomplete in different
economic models. She precedes us in showing the applicability in oligopoly situations
of the theoretical results which characterize equilibria in the framework of vector-
valued utilities.
Our first result is the characterization of the set of Pareto equilibria of the
Cournot game, with and without non-negative conditions on demand realizations.
This set is symmetric and only depends on the quantities of perfect competition in
the two scenarios, thus generalizing the classic Cournot equilibrium. On the neg-
ative side, the set of Pareto equilibria contains an infinity of demand pairs which
renders this concept insufficient for conclusions to be drawn about the equilibria at
which agents will arrive in real-world duopolistic markets.
However, this general setting permits the analysis of a range of situations in which
firms exhibit different attitudes towards risk. In the second part of the paper, specific
attitudes towards risk are introduced into the model. When agents are pessimistic,
exhibiting extreme risk aversion, the maxmin principle is applied. In this context,
we show that in non-trivial cases multiple equilibria exist. An important fact is that
the total quantity offered in all these equilibria is a constant, and all equilibria yield
the same price. That is, the price at equilibria is unique.
On the other hand, for optimistic agents, who only value the best results they
can obtain, a criterion consisting of maximizing the maximum benefit is applied. In
this case, we also prove that equilibria always exist. Moreover, we show that any
game has either a unique optimistic equilibrium, which coincides with the Cournot
equilibrium of one of the scenarios, or that both Cournot equilibria of the scenarios
are optimistic equilibria.
The relevance of the results we present herein for conservative and optimistic
equilibria lies in the understanding of the effects of uncertainty in the final equilib-
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rium outcome. If firms are conservative, the uncertainty with respect to both the
total quantity to be offered and the price that reaches such a quantity disappears.
That is, regardless of the state of nature that finally occurs, all conservative equi-
libria provide the same output and price level. However, if firms show preference
for risk, the price depends on the state of nature that will take place, and since
different equilibria may exist, the quantity that the firms will eventually produce at
equilibrium can not be predicted.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the Cournot model
under uncertainty is presented and the corresponding set of Pareto equilibria is
characterized. In Section 3, the attitude towards risk of the agents is introduced into
the analysis. We obtain results which permit the identification of equilibria when
agents show extreme risk aversion and when the agents are optimistic. Section 4 is
devoted to the conclusions of our research. In order to ease the presentation, proofs
are included in an Appendix.
2 Pareto Equilibria in the Cournot model under
demand uncertainty
In this section a Cournot model with an uncertain linear demand function is anal-
ysed. In previous literature uncertainty in the demand function is usually modelled
either as an uncertain intercept, which is applied in cases where firms are uncertain
about the reservation price, or as an uncertain slope, which can represent situations
in which firms are uncertain about the number of consumers in the market.
We address a general model where uncertainty affects both the intercept and the
slope which allows us to represent situations of uncertainty in terms of type and
number of consumers. For example, firms trying to introduce a new product in the
market are unsure whether they are going to be successful in a small market with
consumers of high income with a high reservation price or in a bigger market with
consumers of low income with a lower reservation price.
We consider a duopoly model in which two identical firms producing homoge-
neous commodities compete in quantities and face uncertain market demand since
two different future scenarios are possible.
The inverse demand function at scenario k, k = 1, 2, is given by p = αk − γkq,
with αk, γk > 0. For simplicity, it is assumed that firms have no fixed costs and their
marginal costs are equal to zero. In our setting, firms make their output decision,
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q1, q2, before the uncertainty is resolved. For i = 1, 2, the benefit for firm i at
scenario k is
Πik(q
1, q2) = qi(αk − γk(q1 + q2)).
Without loss of generality, throughout the paper it is assumed that
α1
γ1
<
α2
γ2
,
that is, the quantity of perfect competition in the first scenario is lower than that
of the second scenario.
If the two scenarios are considered separately, then a Cournot equilibrium exists
in each, given by
(q1∗k , q
2∗
k ) = (
αk
3γk
,
αk
3γk
).
The situations we are going to investigate are those in which no information exists
about the probability of occurrence of the scenarios or the existing information is
not held by the agents. In such cases, the game the firms face is formally a normal-
form game with vector-valued utility function G = {(Ai, ui)i=1,2}, where Ai is the
set of strategies that agent i can adopt and ui is his vector-valued utility function,
ui := (Πi1(q
1, q2),Πi2(q
1, q2)).
We refer to these games as Cournot games under uncertainty, and denote the
Cournot game under uncertainty in which firms are allowed to select any non-
negative quantity as GUC+ = {(R+,Πi)i=1,2}.
We will adopt the term Pareto Equilibrium (PE ) to refer to the natural extension
of the concept of Nash equilibrium for these games with vector-valued utilities.
Definition 2.1. (q∗1, q∗2) is a Pareto Equilibrium for the game G = {(Ai, ui)i=1,2}
if /∃ q1 ∈ A1 such that u1k(q1, q∗2) ≥ u1k(q∗1, q∗2) for k = 1, 2 (with a strict inequality
for some k), and /∃ q2 ∈ A2 such that u2k(q∗1, q2) ≥ u2k(q∗1, q∗2) for k = 1, 2 (with a
strict inequality for some k).
The set of Pareto Equilibria for G = {(Ai, ui)i=1,2} is denoted as PE(G).
Note that in our context of complete uncertainty about the occurrence of the
scenarios, a Pareto equilibrium consists of a pair of strategies of the agents such that
neither firm can raise its benefit in both scenarios by deviating from the equilibrium
strategy.
Our focus is on the game GUC+ in which Ai = R+. However, as a previous step we
analyse the relaxed Cournot game GUC = {(R,Πi)i=1,2} in which no non-negativity
constraint is imposed.
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It is worth noting that at each scenario, each firm’s benefit function, Πik(q
1, q2) =
qi(αk − γk(q1 + q2)), is strictly concave in its own action. As a consequence, given
the action of one of the agents, the benefit of the other attains its maximum where
its derivative is null. For i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j, denote rik : Aj → R as the function
which represents the best response of agent i to the actions of agent j at scenario k,
rik(q
j) =
αk − γkqj
2γk
.
The following result characterizes the whole set of Pareto Equilibria of the
Cournot game under uncertainty, GUC . It establishes that the set of equilibria
is bounded by the graphs of the best responses of each agent to the others’ action
at each scenario. This result can be extended to more general benefit functions
provided that they fulfill adequate concavity requirements.
Theorem 2.2. The set of Pareto Equilibria for the game GUC is
PE(GUC) = {(q1, q2) | r11(q2) ≤ q1 ≤ r12(q2), r21(q1) ≤ q2 ≤ r22(q1)}.
The linearity of the response functions enables the set of equilibria, GUC , to
be represented as the convex hull1 of its extreme points. These points corre-
spond to the equilibria of certain associated games. For k, l ∈ {1, 2}, the com-
ponent game GCk,l is defined as a game with complete preferences consisting of
GCk,l = {(A1,Π1k), (A2,Π2l )}. The equilibrium of game GCk,l is obtained as the best
mutual response, that is, the point solving q1 = r1k(q
2) and q2 = r2l (q
1):
(q1∗, q2∗) = (
2
3
αk
γk
− 1
3
αl
γl
,
2
3
αl
γl
− 1
3
αk
γk
).
Denote as C∗k =
αk
3γk
the Cournot equilibrium quantity at scenario k. With this
notation, the equilibrium for game GCk,l becomes
(2C∗k − C∗l , 2C∗l − C∗k).
The following result establishes that the set of Pareto equilibria coincides with
the convex hull of the equilibrium points obtained when each of the firms considers
each one of the possible scenarios. This fact is a consequence of the linearity of the
response functions, and does not extend to the case of general benefit functions.
1The convex hull of S ⊆ R2, is conv(S) = {z ∈ R2 : z = αx+ (1− α)y, x, y ∈ S, α ∈ [0, 1] }.
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Corollary 2.3. The set of Pareto Equilibria for the game GUC is
PE(GUC) = conv{(C∗1 , C∗1), (C∗2 , C∗2), (2C∗1 −C∗2 , 2C∗2 −C∗1), (2C∗2 −C∗1 , 2C∗1 −C∗2)}.
In the game we want to investigate, firms can only select non-negative quantities.
We prove that the set of Pareto equilibria of the game GUC+ coincides with those
Pareto equilibria of GUC with nonnegative components. Formally,
Proposition 2.4. The set of Pareto Equilibria for the game GUC+ is
PE(GUC+ ) = {(q1, q2) ∈ PE(GUC) : q1, q2 ≥ 0}.
In the following result, part a) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the
coincidence of the set of equilibria of the game with non-negative strategies and that
of the relaxed game. Part b) describes the equilibria of GUC+ when this condition
does not hold. Recall that α1
γ1
< α2
γ2
.
Corollary 2.5. a) PE(GUC+ ) = PE(G
UC) if and only if α2
2γ2
≤ α1
γ1
.
b) Otherwise,
PE(GUC+ ) = conv{( α13γ1 , α13γ1 ), ( α23γ2 , α23γ2 ), (α1γ1 , 0), ( α22γ2 , 0), (0, α1γ1 ), (0, α22γ2 )}.
Note that the condition in case a) means that the quantity of perfect competition
in the first scenario has to be at least as much as the monopolistic quantity in the
second scenario.
Figure 1 illustrates the sets of Pareto equilibria in the two different cases.
It is interesting to point out that, as for standard Cournot duopoly, the set of
Pareto Equilibria in Cournot games under uncertainty only depends on the perfect
competition quantity of each scenario.
Another consequence of Proposition 2.4 refers to the extension of the classic
result on the symmetry of standard Nash equilibria. For these Cournot games
under uncertainty where firms face identical benefit functions, Pareto equilibria are
not necessarily symmetric. However, the set of Pareto equilibria is a symmetric set2.
Formally,
Corollary 2.6. The set PE(GUC+ ) is symmetric.
The symmetry of the set of equilibria means that for each non-symmetric equi-
librium pair, another equilibrium exists in which each firm offers the quantity offered
by the opponent in the first equilibrium.
2A set S ⊆ R2 is symmetric if for all (x1, x2) ∈ S then (x2, x1) ∈ S.
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Figure 1: Sets of Pareto equilibria.
3 Conservative and optimistic equilibria
In the general model considered in the section above, firms are assumed to lack any
information about the occurrence of the scenarios, nor is any assumption made on
the firms’ attitude towards risk. However, firms can show different attitudes to risk,
from extreme risk-aversion to extreme preference for risk, due to several reasons,
such as the presence of liquidity constraints or costly financial distress.
The rest of the paper is devoted to the identification of the equilibria to which
the agents will arrive when they exhibit different attitudes towards risk. In our
model such attitudes are explained by the importance that each firm gives to the
realization of profits: a firm is risk-averse if it gives relatively greater importance
to the scenario with low profits, the reverse is true for firms with preference for
risk. More precisely, we consider the extreme cases, i.e., firms present extreme risk-
aversion (or preference) when they only take into account the scenario that implies
the lowest (or highest) profits. The former are named conservative firms and the
latter, optimistic firms.
In the previous section, the set of Pareto equilibria for the Cournot game under
uncertainty only depends on the quantities of perfect competition in both scenarios.
However, it is when we seek to refine the set of equilibria by including risk attitudes
in the model, that the other parameters of the demand function and the relationships
between them become relevant.
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Given the inverse demand functions of the scenarios p = αk − γkq, for k = 1, 2,
if γ1 6= γ2, then there is a unique value of the demand for which prices coincide at
both scenarios, q = α1−α2
γ1−γ2 . The relative position of this value with respect to the
Cournot quantities and to the perfect competition quantities at the two scenarios
plays a key role in the analysis of the conservative equilibria and optimistic equilibria
of the Cournot game. We first observe that when the reservation price in the first
scenario is higher than that of the second, then this value is smaller than the total
quantity offered in perfect competition in the first scenario. Otherwise, this value is
either non-positive or greater than or equal to the perfect competition quantity in
the second scenario. These facts are stated formally in the following lemma which
is easy to prove by using a geometric argument.
Lemma 3.1. Provided that α1
γ1
< α2
γ2
,
a) If α1 > α2 then 0 <
α1−α2
γ1−γ2 <
α1
γ1
.
b) If α1 ≤ α2
b1) γ2 < γ1, then
α1−α2
γ1−γ2 ≤ 0.
b2) γ2 > γ1,
α1−α2
γ1−γ2 >
α2
γ2
.
3.1 Conservative equilibria
In order to model situations in which agents exhibit extreme risk aversion, we con-
sider a standard normal-form game in which the utility of the firms is represented
by the worst benefit obtained in the scenarios. For i = 1, 2, the real-valued utility
function of firm i is:
Πic(q
1, q2) = Min{Πi1(q1, q2),Πi2(q1, q2)}.
In accordance, the definition of conservative equilibrium is:
Definition 3.2. (q∗1, q∗2) is a conservative equilibrium for the Cournot game G =
{(Ai,Πi)i=1,2} if for each q1 ∈ A1, q1 6= q∗1, Π1c(q1, q∗2) < Π1c(q∗1, q∗2) holds, and for
each q2 ∈ A2, q2 6= q∗2, Π2c(q∗1, q2) < Π2c(q∗1, q∗2) holds.
The set of conservative equilibria of a game G is denoted by Ec(G).
In an equilibrium the strategy of each firm is the best response to the strategy of
the other firm, and therefore, conservative firms obtain quantities such that no indi-
vidual deviation produces an improvement in the minimum benefit. The strategies
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adopted by the firms in a conservative equilibrium can be seen as robust strategies,
in the sense that whichever scenario finally materializes each firm maximizes its
assured benefit.
We first establish that, for the Cournot game under uncertainty, the set of con-
servative equilibria is a subset of the set of Pareto equilibria. A self-contained proof
of this fact is presented in the Appendix. The result can also be obtained as a
consequence of Theorem 1 in Bade (2005).
Proposition 3.3. Ec(GUC+ ) ⊆ PE(GUC+ ).
We are now interested in the existence and in the identification of the conservative
equilibria for Cournot games under uncertainty GUC+ . The following theorem is a
result that is central to our analysis. It shows that if the firms exhibit extreme
risk aversion, then equilibria always exist. Moreover, it states the conditions on
the parameters of the demand functions for a unique equilibrium to exist. In this
case the equilibrium coincides with the Cournot equilibrium in one of the scenarios.
We also prove that when multiple equilibria exist, the total quantity offered by the
agents is the value of the demand for which prices coincide at both scenarios, α1−α2
γ1−γ2 .
The proof of the results rely on the concavity of the conservative utility of the agents
with respect to their own action.
Theorem 3.4. Assume that α1
γ1
< α2
γ2
. The set of conservative equilibria for the
Cournot game GUC+ is
a) If α1 ≤ α2, then Ec(GUC+ ) = {( α13γ1 , α13γ1 )}.
b) If α1 > α2 and
α1−α2
γ1−γ2 ≤ 2α13γ1 , then Ec(GUC+ ) = {( α13γ1 , α13γ1 )}.
c) If α1 > α2 and
2α1
3γ1
< α1−α2
γ1−γ2 <
2α2
3γ2
, then
Ec(GUC+ ) = PE(G
UC
+ ) ∩ {(q1, q2) | q1 + q2 =
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 }.
d) If α1 > α2 and
2α2
3γ2
≤ α1−α2
γ1−γ2 , then E
c(GUC+ ) = {( α23γ2 , α23γ2 )}.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate cases b) and c) respectively. In the case of Figure 2,
the whole set of Pareto equilibria lies on the region in which the conservative utility
coincides with the benefit in scenario 1, and therefore the conservative equilibrium
is the Cournot equilibria in scenario 1. The best response functions of risk-averse
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Figure 2: A unique conservative equi-
librium
Firm 1
Firm 2
↵1 ↵2
 1  2
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Ec
Figure 3: Multiple conservative equi-
libria
firms in case c) are represented in Figure 3. The points located on both lines are
the conservative equilibria.
Remarks: A first remark is that only in the cases in which the Cournot equilibria
quantities in the two scenarios are very similar, does the conservative equilibrium
correspond to the equilibria in the second scenario. Note that α1
γ1
< α2
γ2
and 2α2
3γ2
< α1
γ1
must hold so that {( α2
3γ2
, α2
3γ2
)} is the conservative equilibrium.
It is also worth remarking that in the case in which a multiplicity of conservative
equilibria exists (case c)), all of them correspond to the same price: p =
α2γ1 − α1γ2
γ1 − γ2 ,
and the total quantity offered is q =
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 . That is, the equilibrium price is
unique. In addition, given one of these equilibria, each agent obtains the same
benefit in both scenarios.
Moreover, the explicit expressions of the total quantity and the price at the
conservative equilibria enables us to make predictions about the equilibrium price.
If the reservation prices of the markets (αk) approach each other (move away from
each other) or the sizes of the markets (γk) differ more (become more similar), then
the total equilibrium quantity decreases (increases) and therefore the equilibrium
price increases (decreases).
If the changes are such that the conditions in c) are no longer fulfilled, the prices
12
at the equilibria then depend on the final scenario. A detailed study of comparative
statics for this model would involve keeping track of the changes in the corresponding
parameters for each case, and no general results can be obtained.
3.2 Optimistic Equilibria
The other extreme case in terms of risk attitude of the firms is the situation when the
two firms select their strategies by only taking into account the best of the results
they can obtain. The utility of the firms is now given by:
Πiop(q
1, q2) = Max{Πi1(q1, q2),Πi2(q1, q2)}.
This optimistic utility function coincides with Πi1 when (γ1 − γ2)(q1 + q2) ≤
α1 − α2, and with Πi2 otherwise.
Definition 3.5. (q∗1, q∗2) is an optimistic equilibrium for the Cournot game G =
{(Ai,Πi)i=1,2} if for each q1 ∈ A1, q1 6= q∗1, Π1op(q1, q∗2) < Π1op(q∗1, q∗2) holds, and
for each q2 ∈ A2, q2 6= q∗2, Π2op(q∗1, q2) < Π2op(q∗1, q∗2) holds.
We denote by Eop(G) to the set of optimistic equilibria of game G.
Optimistic equilibria are also Pareto Equilibria, as established below.
Proposition 3.6. Eop(GUC+ ) ⊆ PE(GUC+ ).
In contrast to the case of the conservative utility function, the optimistic utility
does not exhibit desirable concavity properties. This fact increases the complexity
of the analysis of the existence and identification of equilibria. In the following result
Cournot games under uncertainty are classified depending on the relative position
of the value α1−α2
γ1−γ2 and the Cournot quantities. It establishes that in certain cases
(a), b) d)) a unique optimistic equilibrium exists which coincides with the Cournot
equilibrium of one of the scenarios.
For case c), the relative position of these quantities does not permit the existence
of equilibria to be concluded. However, it permits us to prove that only the Cournot
equilibria associated to the scenarios can be optimistic equilibria for the uncertain
Cournot game.
Theorem 3.7. Assume that α1
γ1
< α2
γ2
. The set of optimistic equilibria for the game
GUC+ is
a) If α1 ≤ α2, then Eop(GUC+ ) = {( α23γ2 , α23γ2 )}.
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b) If α1 > α2 and
α1−α2
γ1−γ2 ≤ 2α13γ1 , then Eop(GUC+ ) = {( α23γ2 , α23γ2 )}.
c) If α1 > α2 and
2α1
3γ1
< α1−α2
γ1−γ2 <
2α2
3γ2
, then Eop(GUC+ ) ⊆ {( α13γ1 , α13γ1 ), ( α23γ2 , α23γ2 )}.
d) If α1 > α2 and
2α2
3γ2
≤ α1−α2
γ1−γ2 , then E
op(GUC+ ) = {( α13γ1 , α13γ1 )}.
It remains to analyse the situation in case c). In order to do this, it is important
to identify at which values of the strategy of his opponent, an optimistic agent
switches from reacting with the best response at one scenario to reacting with the
best response at the other scenario. The values of q for which the benefit obtained
in scenario 1 with the best response in scenario 1 coincides with the benefit in
scenario 2 with the best response in scenario 2 are the values for which agent 2 will
change from one of the best responses to the other. The relative positions of one of
these values and the Cournot quantities of the scenarios, determine the optimistic
equilibria of the uncertain Cournot game.
Recall that for k = 1, 2, given an action of agent i, the best response of agent j
in his feasible set of actions (qj ≥ 0) in scenario k is rjk(qi) = αk−γkq
i
2γk
if qi ≤ αk
γk
, and
rjk(q
i) = 0 if qi ≥ αk
γk
.
The Lemma below states that for optimistic agents there is at most one point,
qm, in the set of actions in which the optimistic best response switches from the best
response of scenario 1 to that of scenario 2.
Lemma 3.8. Assume that α1
γ1
< α2
γ2
in the game GUC+ . Let qm =
α1−α2
γ1−γ2− 1√γ1γ2
α2γ1−α1γ2
γ1−γ2 .
For j = 1, 2 the best response function of an optimistic agent j, rjop, is given by
rjop(q
i) = rj1(q
i) for qi ≤ qm, and rjop(qi) = rj2(qi) for qi > qm.
The following result establishes that, also in case c) of Theorem 3.7, optimistic
equilibria exist and identifies the optimistic equilibria in the various cases.
Theorem 3.9. Assume that α1
γ1
< α2
γ2
. If α1 > α2 and
2α1
3γ1
< α1−α2
γ1−γ2 <
2α2
3γ2
, then
a) If qm <
α1
3γ1
, then Eop(GUC+ ) = {( α23γ2 , α23γ2 )}.
b) α1
3γ1
≤ qm ≤ α23γ2 , then Eop(GUC+ ) = {( α13γ1 , α13γ1 ), ( α23γ2 , α23γ2 )}.
c) qm >
α2
3γ2
, then Eop(GUC+ ) = {( α13γ1 , α13γ1 )}.
As a conclusion, in relation to the optimistic equilibria of the Cournot game under
uncertainty, any one of three situations is possible: the Cournot equilibrium for the
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Figure 4: Optimistic Equilibria.
first scenario is the optimistic equilibrium; the Cournot equilibrium for the second
scenario is the optimistic equilibrium; or both of them are optimistic equilibria.
Figure 4 illustrates two of these situations. Dotted lines represent the optimistic
best response of Firm 1, and dashed lines represent the optimistic best response of
Firm 2.
Two examples follow. In one of them, a unique optimistic equilibrium exists
which coincides with the Cournot equilibrium in scenario 2. In the other example,
the Cournot equilibria at the two scenarios are optimistic equilibria.
Example 3.10. Consider the Cournot game under uncertainty in which the demand
functions at scenario 1 and 2 are respectively: p = 10− 100q and p = 1− q. In this
case α1 = 10, γ1 = 100, α2 = 1, γ2 = 1. As
α2
2γ2
> α1
γ1
, according to Corollary 2.5 b)
the set of Pareto equilibria is
PE(GUC+ ) = conv{(1/30, 1/30), (1/3, 1/3), (1/10, 0), (1/2, 0), (0, 1/10), (0, 1/2)}.
Since qm = 0, the condition in Theorem 3.9 case a), holds and (1/3, 1/3) is the
optimistic equilibrium.
Note that the Cournot equilibrium in the first scenario is (1/30,1/30) which will
yield a profit equal to 1/9 for each firm at scenario 1. However, if one of the firms
produces 1/30, its optimistic opponent will adopt its best response in scenario 2
and produce 29/60, which will yiel higher profits if eventually scenario 2 is realized:
841/3600. Thus, (1/30, 1/30) is not an optimistic equilibrium. In contrast, if one of
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the firms produces 1/3, the best response of the other firm in scenario 1 is 0, and
thus its profit equals 0. In scenario 2 the best response is 1/3, giving a profit of 2/3.
Therefore, (1/3, 1/3) is the optimistic equilibrium and the profit of each firm in the
optimistic equilibrium will be either 0 or 2/3.
In this uncertain Cournot game, the conservative equilibria are those Pareto
equilibria (q1, q2), such that q1 + q2 = 1/11. The quantity produced by each firm
in the set of conservative equilibria varies from 11/1210 to 9/110, and their profits
(which coincide in the two scenarios) varies accordingly between 1/121 and 9/121.
Example 3.11. Consider the Cournot game under uncertainty in which the demand
functions at scenario 1 and 2 are respectively: p = 300−150q and p = 100−30q. In
this case α1 = 300, γ1 = 150, α2 = 100, γ2 = 30. Therefore,
α2
2γ2
≤ α1
γ1
and according
to corollary 2.5 a) the set of Pareto equilibria is
PE(GUC+ ) = conv{(2/3, 2/3), (10/9, 10/9), (2/9, 14/9), (14/9, 2/9)}.
The Cournot equilibrium in scenario 1 is (2/3, 2/3), and the Cournot equilibrium
in scenario 2 is (10/9, 10/9). Since qm =
5−√5
3
, then (2/3, 2/3) and (10/9, 10/9) are
the optimistic equilibria for this uncertain Cournot game.
In this case, if both firms adopt the strategy corresponding to the Cournot
equilibria in scenario 1, then they obtain either 200/3 or 40. If they adopt the
strategy corresponding to scenario 2, they obtain, either 0 or 1000/27.
In this case, as can be expected, given the quantity of Cournot equilibrium in
scenario 1, the best response of the opponent in scenario 2 is 4/3 with a profit of
160/3, that is, less than 200/3, and therefore (2/3,2/3) is an equilibrium. And given
the quantity of Cournot equilibrium in scenario 2, the best response of the opponent
in scenario 1 is 4/9 with a profit of 800/27(less than 1000/27), and thus (10/9,10/9)
is an equilibrium.
In this uncertain Cournot game, the conservative equilibria are those Pareto
equilibria (q1, q2), such that q1 + q2 = 5/3. The quantity to produce by each firm
in the set of conservative equilibria varies from 1/3 to 4/3, and their profits (which
coincide in the two scenarios) varies accordingly between 50/3 and 200/3.
4 Concluding remarks
An alternative analysis of the Cournot duopoly under demand uncertainty, which
differs from those existing in the literature, is presented in this paper.
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The situations considered are formalized as normal-form games with vector-
valued utility functions. When no assumption about the firms’ attitude towards
risk can be made, then the set of equilibria to which the agents will arrive solely
depends on the quantities of perfect competition of the scenarios as is the case in the
classic Cournot equilibrium. In addition, the set of Pareto equilibria is a symmetric
set, although Pareto equilibria are not necessarily symmetric.
The introduction into the model of the attitude of the firms towards risk carries
a major implication on the equilibria that the firms will attain. The analysis of the
particular cases of pessimistic and optimistic firms provides interesting results. The
existence of equilibria when both firms are simultaneously pessimistic is established,
together with conditions on the parameters of the demand functions for the unicity
of the equilibrium. When there are multiple equilibria, a significant property is that
all of them yield the same price. In relation with situations in which both firms are
simultaneously optimistic, we also prove that equilibria always exist and we show
that any uncertain Cournot game has either a unique optimistic equilibrium, which
coincides with the Cournot equilibrium of one of the scenarios, or both Cournot
equilibria of the scenarios are optimistic equilibria.
The results presented in this paper constitute the starting point for a complete
study of the equilibria in the cases in which the risk-attitude of each agent is different.
This analysis may help to explain some real-world situations. For instance, the recent
financial crisis has highlighted the differences between firms with respect to attitude
towards risk and the potential equilibria should be investigated in this framework.
5 Appendix: proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.2: First note that since
α1
γ1
<
α2
γ2
, then ri1(q
j) < ri2(q
j) for
all qj ∈ Aj.
Consider a point (q¯1, q¯2) such that q¯1 < r11(q¯
2). Since each firm’s objective
function, Πik, is strictly concave in the firm’s own quantity, both Π
1
1(q
1, q¯2) and
Π12(q
1, q¯2) are increasing for q1 ≤ r11(q¯2), therefore, it follows that if agent 1 moves to
q¯1 + ε then his benefit will increase in both scenarios. Hence, (q¯1, q¯2) 6∈ PE(GUC).
Analogously, this holds for q¯1 > r12(q¯
2).
On the other hand, if r11(q¯
2) ≤ q¯1 ≤ r12(q¯2), r21(q¯1) ≤ q¯2 ≤ r22(q¯1), then any
individual movement of one of the agents produces an increase of the benefit in one
of the scenarios and a decrease in the other, and therefore (q¯1, q¯2) ∈ PE(GUC).
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Proof of Theorem 2.4: The first inclusion (⊆) follows from the definition of
Pareto equilibrium.
The other inclusion is a consequence of the strict concavity of the benefit func-
tions. To proof it, consider q∗ = (q∗1, q∗2) ∈ PE(GUC+ ). We will distinguish the
following cases:
a) q∗1, q∗2 > 0.
Suppose that the contrary is true: q∗ 6∈ PE(GUC). It follows that for an
agent, say agent 1, there exists an alternative, q1 < 0 such that u11(q
1, q∗2) ≥
u11(q
∗1, q∗2) and u12(q
1, q∗2) ≥ u12(q∗1, q∗2) (with a strict inequality). Let q¯ =
(0, q∗2), 0 = λq1 + (1 − λ)q∗1 with λ ∈ (0, 1). It follows from the strict
concavity of u1k that u
1
k(q¯) > λu
1
k(q
1, q∗2) + (1 − λ)u1k(q∗1, q∗2) ≥ u1k(q∗1, q∗2).
This contradicts q∗ ∈ PE(GUC+ ).
b) q∗1 > 0, q∗2 = 0 (or q∗1 = 0, q∗2 > 0).
Suppose that the contrary is true: q∗ 6∈ PE(GUC). Hence q1∗ < α1
γ1
or q1∗ > α2
2γ2
.
If q1∗ < α1
γ1
, then for a fixed q1∗, the benefit of agent 2, Π2k(q
1∗, q2), is strictly
increasing for both k = 1, 2 at q2 = 0, and therefore, a strategy of agent 2
exists, q2 = ε with ε > 0 such that Π2k(q
1∗, ε) > Π2k(q
1∗, 0) for k = 1, 2. This
contradicts q∗ ∈ PE(GUC+ ).
If q1∗ > α2
2γ2
, then the benefit of agent 1 when q2 fixed at 0, Π1k(q
1, 0) is
strictly decreasing for both k = 1, 2, and therefore, ε > 0 exists, such that, for
q1 = q1∗−ε > 0, Π2k(q1∗−ε, 0) > Π2k(q1∗, 0) holds for k = 1, 2. This contradicts
q∗ ∈ PE(GUC+ ).
c) q∗1 = 0, q∗2 = 0. The reasoning is analogous to that above.
Proof of Proposition 3.3: Let (q∗1, q∗2) be a conservative equilibrium for the
Cournot game GUC+ , and suppose to the contrary that it is not a Pareto equilibrium.
It follows that, for a firm i, a strategy qi ∈ R+ exists such that Πik(qi, q∗j) ≥
Πik(q
∗i, q∗j) for k = 1, 2 (with a strict inequality).
Therefore, since Πik(q
∗i, q∗j) ≥ Πic(q∗i, q∗j) for k = 1, 2, then Πik(qi, q∗j) ≥ Πic(q∗i, q∗j)
for k = 1, 2 and Πic(q
i, q∗j) ≥ Πic(q∗i, q∗j). Thus qi ∈ R+ exists such that Πic(qi, q∗j) ≥
Πic(q
∗i, q∗j), which is a contradiction with (q∗1, q∗2) being a conservative equilibrium.
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Proof of Theorem 3.4: To prove our result we consider several cases which depend
on the relative positions of the demand functions in the two scenarios. Recall that
α1
γ1
< α2
γ2
, and note that the conservative utility function, Πic coincides with Π
i
1 for
(q1, q2) such that (γ1 − γ2)(q1 + q2) ≥ α1 − α2, and coincides with Πi2 otherwise.
a1) α1 ≤ α2 and γ1 > γ2.
It is easy to see that in this case Πic(q
1, q2) = Πi1(q
1, q2) if and only if q1 + q2 ≥
α1−α2
γ1−γ2 . However, since
α1−α2
γ1−γ2 ≤ 0, it follows that Πic(q1, q2) = Πi1(q1, q2) for
all q1, q2 ≥ 0 and therefore the conservative equilibria coincide with that of
scenario 1, Ec(GUC+ ) = {( α13γ1 , α13γ1 )}.
a2) α1 ≤ α2 and γ1 < γ2.
Here Πic(q
1, q2) = Πi1(q
1, q2) if and only if q1 + q2 ≤ α1−α2
γ1−γ2 , and Π
i
c(q
1, q2) =
Πi2(q
1, q2) if and only if q1 + q2 ≥ α1−α2
γ1−γ2 . Since, by Lemma 3.1,
α1−α2
γ1−γ2 >
α2
γ2
,
then the whole set of Pareto Equilibria lies in the region where the conservative
function coincides with the benefit in scenario 1. It is easy to prove that in
this case the conservative equilibrium also coincides with that of scenario 1,
Ec(GUC+ ) = {( α13γ1 , α13γ1 )}.
a3) α1 ≤ α2 and γ1 = γ2.
It is straightforward that in this case Πic(q
1, q2) = Πi1(q
1, q2) for all (q1, q2),
and hence Ec(GUC+ ) = {( α13γ1 , α13γ1 )}.
We will now analyse the cases in which α1 > α2.
For these values, γ1 > γ2, by Lemma 3.1
α1−α2
γ1−γ2 <
α1
γ1
holds, and
Πic(q
1, q2) =
{
qi(α2 − γ2(q1 + q2)) if q1 + q2 ≤ α1−α2γ1−γ2
qi(α1 − γ1(q1 + q2)) if q1 + q2 ≥ α1−α2γ1−γ2
Several subcases are now determined:
b) α1−α2
γ1−γ2 ≤ 2α13γ1 .
For these values of the parameters, the whole set of Pareto equilibria lies
in the region where the conservative function coincides with the benefit in
scenario 1, and the conservative equilibria coincide with that of scenario 1,
Ec(GUC+ ) = {( α13γ1 , α13γ1 )}.
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c) 2α1
3γ1
< α1−α2
γ1−γ2 <
2α2
3γ2
.
To prove that a point (q1∗, q2∗) ∈ PE(GUC+ ) with q1∗ + q2∗ =
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 is a
conservative equilibrium, we rely on the strict concavity of Πik(q
i, qj∗).
Suppose that agent 1 deviates from (q1∗, q2∗) by adopting strategy q1. If
q1 > q1∗, then since Π11(q
1, q2∗) is decreasing, then her utility decreases since
Π1c(q
1, q2∗) = Π11(q
1, q2∗) < Π11(q
1∗, q2∗) = Π1c(q
1∗, q2∗). If q1 < q1∗ then
Π1c(q
1, q2∗) = Πi2(q
1, qj∗). However, in this region, Π12(q
1, q2∗) is increasing
and therefore Π12(q
1, q2∗) < Π12(q
1∗, q2∗) = Π1c(q
1∗, q2∗).
Analogous reasoning with the deviations of agent 2, leads us to the result.
Consider now a point (q1∗, q2∗) ∈ PE(GUC+ ) with q1∗ + q2∗ <
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 .
In this region, Πic(q
1, q2) = Π12(q
1, q2) and given the action of one of the firms,
the benefit at scenario 2 is strictly increasing in its own action. Therefore, any
of the firms will improve its utility by increasing its quantity, and the point is
not a conservative equilibrium.
d) 2α2
3γ2
≤ α1−α2
γ1−γ2 .
In this case, the set of Pareto equilibria lies in the region where the conservative
utility coincides with the benefit at scenario 2 and the conservative equilibria
coincides with that of scenario 2.
Proof of Proposition 3.6: Let (q∗1, q∗2) be an optimistic equilibrium for the
Cournot game GUC+ , and suppose to the contrary that it is not a Pareto equilib-
rium. It follows that, for a firm i, a strategy qi ∈ R+ exists such that Πik(qi, q∗j) ≥
Πik(q
∗i, q∗j) for k = 1, 2 (with a strict inequality). As a consequence, since Πiop(q
i, q∗j) ≥
Πik(q
i, q∗j) for i = 1, 2, then Πiop(q
i, q∗j) ≥ Πik(q∗i, q∗j) for k = 1, 2, and therefore
Πiop(q
i, q∗j) ≥ Πiop(q∗i, q∗j). This contradicts (q∗1, q∗2) being an optimistic equilib-
rium.
Proof of Theorem 3.7: Recall that α1
γ1
< α2
γ2
, and note that the optimistic utility
function Πiop coincides with Π
i
1 for those (q
1, q2) such that (γ1−γ2)(q1+q2) ≤ α1−α2,
and coincides with Πi2 otherwise. Several subcases can be determined:
a1) α1 ≤ α2 and γ1 > γ2.
In this case, Πiop(q
1, q2) = Πi2(q
1, q2) if and only if q1 + q2 ≥ α1−α2
γ1−γ2 . How-
ever, since α1−α2
γ1−γ2 ≤ 0, it follows that Πiop(q1, q2) = Πi2(q1, q2) for all q1, q2 ≥
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0 and therefore the optimistic equilibria coincides with that of scenario 2,
Eop(GUC+ ) = {( α23γ2 , α23γ2 )}.
a2) α1 ≤ α2 and γ1 < γ2.
In this case Πiop(q
1, q2) = Πi2(q
1, q2) if and only if q1 + q2 ≤ α1−α2
γ1−γ2 , and
Πiop(q
1, q2) = Πi1(q
1, q2) if and only if q1 + q2 ≥ α1−α2
γ1−γ2 . Since, by Lemma 3.1,
α1−α2
γ1−γ2 >
α2
γ2
holds, then the whole set of Pareto Equilibria lies in the region
where the optimistic function coincides with the benefit in scenario 2 and the
optimistic equilibria coincide with that of scenario 2, Eop(GUC+ ) = {( α23γ2 , α23γ2 )}.
a3) α1 ≤ α2 and γ1 = γ2.
It is straightforward that in this case Πic(q
1, q2) = Πi2(q
1, q2) for all (q1, q2),
and hence Ec(GUC+ ) = {( α23γ2 , α23γ2 )}.
We now analyse the cases in which α1 > α2.
For these values, γ1 > γ2. By Lemma 3.1,
α1−α2
γ1−γ2 <
α1
γ1
holds and
Πiop(q
1, q2) =
{
qi(α1 − γ1(q1 + q2)) if q1 + q2 ≤ α1−α2γ1−γ2
qi(α2 − γ2(q1 + q2)) if q1 + q2 ≥ α1−α2γ1−γ2
We distinguish several sub-cases.
b) α1−α2
γ1−γ2 <
2α1
3γ1
.
It is easy to see that since the whole set of Pareto equilibria lies in the region
where Πop coincides with Π2, then the only candidate to be an optimistic
equilibria is ( α2
3γ2
, α2
3γ2
). To prove that this point is the optimistic equilibrium,
consider the possible deviations of firm 1 from ( α2
3γ2
, α2
3γ2
). If, by deviating,
(q1, α2
3γ2
) remains in the region where Πop coincides with Π2, then its benefit
decreases. On the other hand, if a negative deviation takes (q1, α2
3γ2
) outside
this region then Πop(q
1, α2
3γ2
) = Π1(q
1, α2
3γ2
). Note that, since Π1 is strictly
increasing in q1, then Π1(q
1, α2
3γ2
) < Π1(q¯
1, α2
3γ2
) = Π2(q¯
1, α2
3γ2
), where q¯1 is such
that q¯1+ α2
3γ2
= α1−α2
γ1−γ2 . Now note that Π2(q¯
1, α2
3γ2
) < Π2(
α2
3γ2
, α2
3γ2
) = Πop(
α2
3γ2
, α2
3γ2
).
Therefore, any deviation from ( α2
3γ2
, α2
3γ2
) yields a strict decrease of the firm’s
optimistic utility. As a consequence ( α2
3γ2
, α2
3γ2
) is the optimistic equilibrium.
c) 2α1
3γ1
< α1−α2
γ1−γ2 <
2α2
3γ2
.
We will prove that only ( α1
3γ1
, α1
3γ1
) and ( α2
3γ2
, α2
3γ2
) can be optimistic equilibria.
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1) Given a point (q1, q2) ∈ PE(GUC+ ) in the interior of PE(GUC+ ), any of the
agents can deviate to his best response corresponding to the scenario in which
the optimistic function coincides with the benefit.
2) Consider now (q1, q2) ∈ PE(GUC+ )\{( α13γ1 , α13γ1 ), ( α23γ2 , α23γ2 )} which lies on some
of the best response lines. Assume without loss of generality that q2 = r21(q
1)
or q2 = r22(q
1):
-If q2 = r21(q
1) and q1 + q2 ≤ α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 , then, since q
1 is not the best response
of agent 1 to this q2, then agent 1 will improve his benefit by moving to his
best response line in scenario 1.
- If q2 = r21(q
1) and q1 + q2 ≥ α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 , then agent 2 will improve its benefit
by moving to his best response line in scenario 2.
-If q2 = r22(q
1) and q1 + q2 ≤ α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 , then agent 2 will improve his benefit
by moving to his best response line in scenario 1.
- If q2 = r22(q
1) and q1 + q2 ≥ α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 , then agent 1 will improve his benefit
by moving to his best response line in scenario 2.
3) If (q1, q2) ∈ PE(GUC+ ) with q2 = 0 and lies on the boundary of PE(GUC+ ),
then q1 ≥ α1
γ1
. As a consequence of Lemma 3.1, α1−α2
γ1−γ2 ≤ α1γ1 holds and it follows
that at this point the optimistic utility coincides with the benefit in scenario
2. In this situation, firm 2 can improve its optimistic utility by adopting a
strategy q¯2 > 0. Therefore, (q1, 0) is not an optimistic equilibrium.
Analogous reasoning is valid if If (q1, q2) ∈ PE(GUC+ ) with q1 = 0 and lies on
the boundary of PE(GUC+ ).
d) 2α2
3γ2
< α1−α2
γ1−γ2 .
The reasoning is analogous to that of sub-case a3).
Proof of Lemma 3.8: When the strategy of agent 1 is q1 ≤ α1
γ1
, agent 2 has
the possibility of adopting the best response function corresponding to the first
scenario or to the second scenario. If agent 2 is optimistic, then he only considers
the maximum of the benefits he obtains with these best responses, that is, the
maximum of the following two quantities:
Π21(q
1, r21(q
1)) =
(α1 − γ1q1)2
4γ1
, Π22(q
1, r22(q
1)) =
(α2 − γ2q1)2
4γ2
.
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In other words, for q1 ≤ α1
γ1
, the best response of agent 2 is r2op(q
1) = r2k(q
1) where
for each q1, k is such that
(αk − γkq1)2
4γk
= max{(α1 − γ1q
1)2
4γ1
,
(α2 − γ2q1)2
4γ2
}.
On the other hand, when q1 ≥ α1
γ1
, then the best response of agent 2 at scenario
1 is r21(q
1) = 0 and therefore r2op(q
1) = r22(q
1).
Note that, as a consequence of the symmetry of our model, for each q ≤ α1
γ1
,
Π21(q, r
2
1(q)) = Π
1
1(r
1
1(q), q) and Π
2
2(q, r
2
1(q)) = Π
1
2(r
1
2(q), q). Hence, for q ≤ α1γ1 , the
best response of agent 1, r1op(q), is attained for the same scenario as the best response
for agent 2, r2op(q). On the other hand if q ≥ α1γ1 , then r1op(q) = r12(q).
It is important to identify at which values of the strategy of his opponent, an
optimistic agent switches from reacting with the best response at one scenario to
reacting with the best response at the other scenario. The values of q for which the
benefit obtained in scenario 1 with the best response in scenario 1 coincides with the
benefit in scenario 2 with the best response in scenario 2 are the values for which
agent 2 will change from one of the best responses to the other. These values are
obtained by solving the equation
(α1 − γ1q)2
4γ1
=
(α2 − γ2q)2
4γ2
.
Denote these quantities as qm and qM :
qm =
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 −
1√
γ1γ2
α2γ1 − α1γ2
γ1 − γ2 , qM =
α1 − α2
γ1 − γ2 +
1√
γ1γ2
α2γ1 − α1γ2
γ1 − γ2 .
A first remarkable fact is that one and only one of these switching points is
below α1
γ1
. That is, qm <
α1
γ1
< qM : Clearly qm <
α1−α2
γ1−γ2 , and it follows from Lemma
3.1 that α1−α2
γ1−γ2 ≤ α1γ1 , therefore the first inequality holds. The second inequality
is obtained by taking into account that in this case γ2 < γ1, and by performing
algebraic operations.
Now note that both Π21(q, r
2
1(q)) =
(α1−γ1q)2
4γ1
and Π22(q, r
2
2(q)) =
(α2−γ2q)2
4γ2
are
convex parabolic functions attaining their minima at α1
γ1
and α2
γ2
respectively. Hence,
for q < α1
γ1
they are both decreasing. Since for q = α1
γ1
, Π22(q, r
2
2(q)) > Π
2
1(q, r
2
1(q)),
it follows that Π22(q, r
2
2(q)) > Π
2
1(q, r
2
1(q)) for those q such that qm < q <
α1
γ1
. It also
follows that Π21(q, r
2
1(q)) > Π
2
2(q, r
2
2(q)) for all q < qm.
As a consequence, given an action of one of the agents q ≥ 0, the best response
of the optimistic opponent is: For q < qm, r
2
op(q) = r
2
1(q) = r
1
op(q) = r
1
1(q). For all
q > qm, r
2
op(q) = r
2
2(q) = r
1
op(q) = r
1
2(q).
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Proof of Proposition 3.9: From Theorem 3.7 it is known that the only points
which can be optimistic equilibria are the Cournot equilibria of the two scenarios.
We will analyse whether they are or not:
a) qm <
α1
3γ1
.
In this case, r2op(
α1
3γ1
) = r22(
α1
3γ1
) 6= α1
3γ1
and therefore ( α1
3γ1
, α1
3γ1
) is not an opti-
mistic equilibria.
On the other hand, since qm <
α2
3γ2
also holds, then r2op(
α2
3γ2
) = r22(
α2
3γ2
) = α2
3γ2
.
Symmetrically, r1op(
α2
3γ2
) = r12(
α2
3γ2
) = α2
3γ2
.
It follows that ( α2
3γ2
, α2
3γ2
) is the unique optimistic equilibrium in this case.
b) α1
3γ1
≤ qm ≤ α23γ2 .
In this case, r2op(
α1
3γ1
) = r21(
α1
3γ1
) = α1
3γ1
and symmetrically r1op(
α1
3γ1
) = α1
3γ1
. There-
fore ( α1
3γ1
, α1
3γ1
) is an optimistic equilibria.
Analogous reasoning leads us to conclude that ( α2
3γ2
, α2
3γ2
) is also an optimistic
equilibrium.
c) qm >
α2
3γ2
. By using an identical argument as in case b), we conclude that
( α1
3γ1
, α1
3γ1
) is an optimistic equilibrium. By a reasoning to that of case a), it can
be proven that ( α2
3γ2
, α2
3γ2
) is not an optimistic equilibrium.
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